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BANKRUPTCY LAW AND INEFFICIENT ENTITLEMENTS
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ABSTRACT
The question as to the justification of bankruptcy law remains unanswered. The 
literature tends to emphasize the conflict and inability to compromise between the 
different normative outlooks of the insolvency law system. A deeper reflection on the 
existing theories of bankruptcy law reveals, however, that all theories share the same 
starting point: All theories share the understanding that efficiency considerations 
justify the enforcement of contractual bankruptcy arrangements. When the social 
theories call for increased levels of coercion and redistribution, these theories rely on 
normative considerations of distributive justice and rehabilitation values. They by no 
means rely on efficiency grounds. This article presents a new theory of bankruptcy 
law that challenges this shared starting point. The article joins the economic analysis’ 
focus on efficiency considerations. It calls for bankruptcy law rules that would 
maximize the aggregate value of the debtor’s assets to his or her creditors and equity 
holders. Yet, the analysis shows that under particular circumstances, efficiency-based 
considerations can support the coercive avoidance of existing entitlements. 
Accordingly, I will argue that the role of bankruptcy law is to provide the procedural 
and substantive framework for severing the debtor’s economic resources from his or 
her inefficient liabilities. Finally, the analysis shows how the new theoretical 
framework explains many of the positive legal arrangements of bankruptcy law. First, 
it explains why courts prefer reorganization plans over liquidation proceedings. 
Second, it explains the special priority that is afforded by the law to post-petition 
creditors. Finally, it explains the arrangements regarding executory contracts. 
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INTRODUCTION
The question as to the justification of bankruptcy law remains unanswered. The 
literature tends to emphasize the conflict and inability to compromise between the 
different normative outlooks of the insolvency law system.1 In particular, the 
literature emphasizes the conflict between the economic perspectives that focus on the 
efforts to maximize the value paid to the creditors in the event of insolvency, and the 
social perspectives, which emphasize the social and rehabilitation value of the law. 
Naturally, the specific laws that derive from each of these perspectives differ greatly, 
while it appears that the compound that developed in the positive law over the years is 
a quasi-amalgam, lacking any clear preference towards any of the different 
approaches.  
In particular, contemporary theories of bankruptcy law conflict on two main issues: 
First, the accurate level of justified coercion that should be involved in the bankruptcy 
proceedings; and second, the accurate level of justified intervention with prior 
entitlements. While contemporary economic analysis of bankruptcy law calls for 
contractual bankruptcy arrangements,2 the social theories support a more 
interventionist regulation to protect the “weak” parties against the losses of 
1 For this ongoing debate, see O. Tene, Revisiting the Creditors Bargain: The 
Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 
19 Bank. Dev. J. 287 (2003), and the references therein; C.W.Mooney, A Normative 
Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (is) Civil Procedure, U of Penn, Inst for 
Law & Econ Research Paper 03-27, (June, 2003), and the references therein; L. M. 
Lopucki, The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, UCLA School of 
Law, Law & Econ Research Paper No. 3-11 (April, 2003); M.E. Tracht, Contractual 
Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice, and Law, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 301 
(1997); C. W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial 
Process, 74 N.C.L. Rev. 75 (1995); J.L. Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in 
Bankruptcy, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 795 (2004).
2 See A. Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107
Yale L.J. 1807, 1851 (1998) ("This Essay's central claim is captured in a variation on 
a trendy slogan: Privatize bankruptcy."); A. Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting 
Reviewed, 109 Yale L.J. 343, 343 (1999) ("If the rule against contracting for a 
preferred bankruptcy system were relaxed, parties would write bankruptcy contracts 
that would induce a borrowing firm to choose the system that would be optimal for it 
and its creditors were it to become insolvent."); B. Adler, B. Polak, and A. Schwartz, 
Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. Legal Stud. 585 
(2000); R.K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies through Private 
Ordering, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2252 (2002); D.G. Baird & R.K. Rasmussen, The End of 
Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (2002).
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insolvency.3 Thus, while economic analysis challenges the coercive interference of 
the bankruptcy courts with contractual arrangements made prior to the insolvency 
event, social theories support a legally enforced redistribution scheme in bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
A deeper reflection on the existing theories of bankruptcy law reveals, however, that 
all theories share the same starting point: All theories share the understanding that 
efficiency considerations justify the enforcement of contractual bankruptcy 
arrangements. All theories presume that the protection of entitlements that were 
formed ex ante would maximize the aggregate efficiency. The enforcement of prior 
entitlements secures the efficient planning of credit transactions by solvent 
corporations. When the social theories call for increased levels of coercion and 
redistribution, these theories rely on normative considerations of distributive justice 
and rehabilitation values. They by no means rely on efficiency grounds.
The present article presents a new theory of bankruptcy law that challenges this 
shared starting point. The article joins the economic analysis’ focus on efficiency 
considerations. It calls for bankruptcy law rules that would maximize the aggregate 
value of the debtor’s assets to his or her creditors and equity holders. Yet, the analysis 
shows that under particular circumstances, efficiency-based considerations can 
support the coercive avoidance of existing entitlements. Under these particular 
circumstances, the existing entitlements drive the business into an inefficient use of its 
economic resources, which in turn leads to financial distress. Apparently, rational 
parties should then renegotiate their contracts, and reconstruct the company liabilities. 
However, I will point out several factors that may obstruct the renegotiation process 
3 See S. Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 503; S. Block-Lieb, The Politics of Privatizing Business Bankruptcy Law, 74 
Am. Bankr. L.J. 77 (2000); C.J. Tabb, Of Contractarians and Bankruptcy Reform: A 
Skeptical View, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 259 (2004); R.B. Chapman, Missing 
Persons: Social Science and Accounting for Race, Gender, Class, and Marriage in 
Bankruptcy, 76 Am. Bankr. L.J. 347 (2002); E. Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 
U.Chi.L.Rev. 775 (1987); E. Warren & J. L. Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of 
Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 Am. Bankr. L.J. 499 (1998); D. Korobkin, Bankruptcy 
Law, Ritual, and Performance, 103 Colum.L.Rev. 2124 (2003); D. Korobkin, 
Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 Colum.L.Rev. 717 (1991); 
D. Korobkin, The Role of Normative Theory in Bankruptcy Debates, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 
75 (1996).
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and preclude the possibility of contractual settlement. When these cumulative 
conditions are satisfied, the coercive interference of the bankruptcy proceedings may 
become essential for shifting the company resources back to efficient business 
activity. 
This argument will provide the framework for defining both the circumstances that 
should trigger the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, and the role of 
bankruptcy law. In particular, the law must regulate the commencement of bankruptcy 
proceedings when the following three cumulative conditions are satisfied: First, the 
debtor’s existing entitlements produce an inefficient use of economic resources; 
second, the debtor has failed in his or her attempt to reconstruct the existing liabilities; 
and third, the inefficient entitlements lead the debtor into financial distress. Then, in 
the absence of any legal intervention, the inefficient use of economic resources would 
have been perpetuated, whereas, the costs of inefficient activities would have been 
augmented over time. Some form of coercive interference is essential for shifting the 
economic resources back to efficient activity. Accordingly, I will argue that the role 
of bankruptcy law is to provide the procedural and substantive framework for 
severing the debtor’s economic resources from his or her inefficient liabilities. Thus, 
bankruptcy proceedings inherently involve some level of coercion and redistribution. 
Finally, I will show that the new theory can explain many of the positive legal 
arrangements of bankruptcy law. First, it explains why courts prefer reorganization
plans over liquidation proceedings. Second, it explains the special priority that is 
afforded by the law to new investors, who provide new financial resources to the 
bankrupt company. Finally, it provides the normative framework for the legal 
arrangement of executory contracts. 
PART I of the article presents the main conflicting views concerning the role and 
content of bankruptcy law. PART II of the article presents the efficiency-based 
justification for coercive avoidance of existing entitlements. PART III of the article 
explains how bankruptcy law leads to the severance of the debtor’s assets from his or 
her contemporary liabilities. Finally, PART IV of the article discusses the concrete 
legal arrangements, and shows how positive arrangements reconcile with the above 
theory.
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PART I: THE EXISTING LITERATURE
1. Economic Goals vs. Social Goals
The main conflict between the different approaches of bankruptcy law is the familiar 
one between the economic and social approaches to the law. The economic approach 
emphasizes the efficiency aims of the law, i.e., aims relating to ways to enlarge the 
“aggregate pie which is to be divided,” whereas social approaches emphasize the 
policy considerationsappropriate to guide the law in deciding the distribution rules of  
“the aggregate pie” between the different individuals. In the context of bankruptcy 
law, the economic approaches emphasize the goal of enlarging the value of the 
bankrupt estate, while the social perspectives focus on the worthy distribution rules, 
which should govern the situation amongst the creditors.   
In the context of the economic approach, it is correct to distinguish between the early
economic approach of liquidation law and the later one. In 1986, Professor Jackson 
published his book The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, in which he presents the 
aims and limitations of bankruptcy law.4 According to his thesis, the source of 
bankruptcy law is in the “common pool” problem and the prisoner’s dilemma that it 
causes: In the case of insolvency, the company’s assets are too few to sufficiently 
cover payment of the company’s debts in their entirety. The law grants the creditors 
the right to confiscate the assets in order to pay back the debts; however, it is clear at 
the outset that there are not sufficient mutual reserves of company assets in order to 
pay back the debts in full. The consequence is that collection laws create an arbitrary 
method according to which, “the early bird catches the worm”: The creditors who will 
reach the end of the collection process before the other creditors will succeed in 
getting their debts repaid in full, while the rest of them will be left empty-handed. The 
arbitrary method of “the early bird catches the worm” creates a quasi “race” of 
creditors towards the communal fund. However, this race diminishes from the 
comprehensive value of all the assets and minimizes the value of all the debts that will 
be paid from the communal reserves. In other words, in the case of insolvency, the 
ordinary collection laws create a situation in which every single one of the creditors 
acts in a fashion that is not beneficial for the common, collective interests of the 
4 R. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986); See also Baird & 
Jackson, Cases, Problems and Materials on Bankruptcy, (1985), at 31.
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aggregate of creditors. Bankruptcy law attempts to solve this dilemma by pooling all 
creditors together, and by submitting them to collective proceedings. Later in the 
book, Professor Jackson delves into an in depth discussion on the contents of 
bankruptcy law, while trying to show that the existing set of laws does indeed match 
the idea of “the communal reserves.” Furthermore, the author claims that the aims of 
bankruptcy law must be limited to that of solving the prisoner’s dilemma, which is 
created as a result of the communal reserves phenomenon. This set of laws must not 
deviate from this goal, because were that to occur, the bankruptcy laws would 
produce inefficient outcomes. 
Professor Jackson’s theory greatly influenced the development of the later literature. 
In particular, authors that support social insights of bankruptcy law emphasized the 
limited spectrum that the idea of “the communal reserves” places on this field of law, 
while stressing that bankruptcy law provides answers for a wide variety of problems.5
Gradually, also those supporting the economic analysis joined in and began to voice 
criticism towards Professor Jackson’s theory. From these authors’ point of view, the 
idea of communal reserves is problematic, since it appears to provide justification for
the massive interference of the law in the relationship amongst the creditors 
themselves, and between them and the shareholders. The modern economic approach 
states that when individuals are given sufficient freedom, they will design their own 
solutions in the event of possible insolvency, already at the early stage of entering the 
original contract.6 Therefore, for example, creditors who are interested in securing 
their payment in a case of insolvency will make certain to get a security interest in the 
company’s assets. The security interest mechanism is a contractual, desired 
mechanism through which the creditors and the company bring to fruition their own 
desired solution, in the case of insolvency. Likewise, when the parties fail in their 
attempt to design this possible solution at the outset, then in retrospect, they will reach 
an agreement and settlement also without the law’s interference. When the creditors 
are faced once again with a company undergoing hardships, they have incentives to 
try to rehabilitate the company, and an effort to rehabilitate, which is based on the 
5 See E. Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 3.
6 The most radical manifestation of this approach is found in D.G.Baird & R. 
Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, supra note 2. 
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creditors’ agreement to do so, is preferred over an effort to rehabilitate, which is 
forced upon the party by the legal system.
Professor Alan Schwartz calls this solution “Contractual Bankruptcy Law.”7 If this 
concept is indeed correct, then the dominant approach in bankruptcy law should be 
that of refraining from letting the law interfere in agreements, which had been 
established at the outset between the parties. The law must respect, as much as 
possible, the contracts which the parties have signed in regard to the provisions in 
case of insolvency.  
It is worth noting that this approach does not especially oppose the alternative of 
reorganization. However, it does oppose the element of coercion that is involved in 
every legal solution forced upon the parties by the court. In other words, a 
redistribution of the claims which is reached as a result of an agreement amongst the 
creditors is preferred over a redistribution which is forced by the legal system. 
The End of Bankruptcy8 presents a contemporary variation of this approach that 
challenges the justification of reorganization proceedings. In this article, the authors 
Baird & Rasmussen claim that today these proceedings are barely used for the 
original purpose of “reviving failed businesses,” and they actually serve the interests 
of the companies’ owners, who wish to sell their businesses for more than they would 
have received had they sold the assets directly via the free market. Baird & 
Rasmussen claim that most reorganization proceedings end up in a sale of the “going 
concern” to a third party. The companies no longer undergo the regular reorganization 
process, where the going concern remains in the hands of the creditors and the 
original shareholders. Rather, the assets are sold to a willing buyer, and the original 
investors are rewarded financially for their holdings in the failed company. 
Additionally, in many cases, the bankruptcy court settles for enforcing the parties’ 
pre-determined distribution of risks, as agreed by the parties ex ante, in preparation 
for the possibility of insolvency. Then, these proceedings lose their original character 
and become traditional proceedings of enforcing contracts. The element of coercion,
which portrays the original bankruptcy proceedings, is gradually disappearing, in 
7 See Schwartz, supra note 2.
8 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 2. 
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favor of proceedings in which the court implements the conditions that the parties 
agreed upon at the outset in the event of insolvency.
The authors base the explanation of this phenomenon on the inconsistent character of 
the market at the beginning of the third millennium. In the past, the value of 
traditional reorganization proceedings was based on the existence of special sources 
of value which were owned by the insolvent company and which could not be 
transferred to a different body without creating losses (These sources of value are 
known as “Firm- Specific Assets”).9 Given that the company does indeed have special 
sources of value, reorganization of the company is the preferable solution: In 
liquidation proceedings, the liquidator must sell the company’s assets, hence losing its 
special sources of value. When selling the company’s assets part by part, it is 
impossible to realize the special sources of value, since these cannot be transferred to 
any other body aside from the original company. Similarly, in the case of selling a 
company’s business as a “going concern,” the company will have to hand over the 
entirety of the company’s assets to the buyer, who in turn, will not be able to enjoy 
the company’s special sources of value. Only in the case of reorganization can the 
company continue to exploit its firm-specific sources of value, for the benefit of its 
creditors and shareholders.10
The traditional example of reorganization of bankrupt companies with firm-specific 
assets concerns the American railroad companies, which collapsed at the beginning of 
the previous century. These companies could not repay their outstanding debts, even 
though they had valuable assets, like train cars, railroad tracks, etc. Had the 
companies been forced to realize these assets, in any way, the value they would have 
received would have been substantially lower than the value of these assets within the 
framework of the railroad companies themselves. In this reality, the alternative of 
reorganization was the one most worthwhile for the creditors and the shareholders of 
those companies. Thus, their creditors supported an “equity receivership,” at which 
9 For the notion of asset specific assets as the basis for incorporation, see R H. 
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA 4 (1937).
10 The theory of Coase relies on the existence of transaction costs. As the 
efficiency of the market improves, these costs lessen. Therefore, according to Baird & 
Rasmussen, as the market becomes more efficient, with lower transaction costs, there 
is no longer an economic justification for reorganization. 
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the railroad companies had been reorganized, already before the reorganization 
alternative was incorporated into the Bankruptcy Act.11
The main claim of The End of Bankruptcy is that this economic reality has changed, 
and today, the economic reality that is analogous to that of the railroad companies 
exists in only a very small number of companies. In the vast majority of cases, the 
failed companies do not hold any special sources of value which cannot be realized 
when sold to a third party. Baird & Rasmussen point out a number of metamorphoses 
that the economy has undergone over the past few decades, which led to the gradual 
nullification of the companies’ firm-specific assets. They claim that especially in the 
current economic situation, the market is divided into “winning players” and “losing 
players,” where the former succeed in taking control of the relevant market in its 
entirety, while the others gradually cease to exist. In a “winner takes it all” reality, the 
losing players no longer hold any special sources of value which cannot be realized by 
selling the company’s business to the winning players. 
Therefore, the need and justification for the existence of complex judicial proceedings 
in which the judge and the trustee seek a reorganization plan, which will enable the 
continued existence of the company and which will satisfy a large number of the 
creditors, is gradually dissipating. In the current reality, the legal system can make 
due with enforcing the contracts that were agreed upon between the parties at the 
outset, regarding the provisions in the event of insolvency.    
The article, The End of Bankruptcy, aroused much criticism among those who 
specialize in economic analysis of the law. In particularly, the critics claim that Baird 
& Rasmussen develop their theoretical analysis on the basis of a factual description 
that is completely unrealistic.12 Competing empirical research show that in most cases 
11 See D. Baird & R. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the 
Conceptual Foundation of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 Va. L. Rev. 921 (2001).
12 The criticism about this radical article focuses on undermining the factual 
claim that today there is loss in realizing the company’s assets by selling them to a 
third party. See L. LoPucky, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm, A Response to Baird 
and Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 645 (2003). The criticism 
points to a consistent rise in bankruptcy and reorganization proceedings. Likewise, it 
shows that many substantial proceedings are customized to coincide with the 
traditional procedure, which chapter 11 brought about. Finally, the criticism points to 
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of insolvency, the legal system continues to enforce arrangements that coincide with 
the classic model of reorganization, in such a way that the existing shareholders and 
creditors are the ones that receive possession of the company after it has been 
rehabilitated. Selling businesses to a third party remains the “exception,” which exists 
only in the minority of the cases. Likewise, empirical research emphasize that Baird 
& Rasmussen’s analysis is based on the assumption that “the company’s assets” 
establish the main justification for its existence. Therefore, from the moment the 
assets can be realized by selling them to a third party without losses, Baird & 
Rasmussen claim that this is the preferable alternative both for the parties and for the 
court. However, in reality, “the company’s assets” are not its main resource. In 
modern reality, “relationships” between the company and its clients, between the 
company and its suppliers, between the company and its human resources, are what 
constitute the main source of value, which justifies the existence of the legal entity. In 
every procedure involving selling assets to a third party, whether the sale is as a whole 
“going concern” or in parts, the relationships that the legal entity represented are lost, 
and hence the justification for preferring reorganization over selling the assets during 
liquidation. As such, the critics emphasize the large number of procedures in which 
the court is not satisfied with simply enforcing the contracts that were agreed upon 
between the parties. 
Until now, I have focused on the criticisms voiced by those who specialize in 
economic analysis of the law. However, the social approaches regarding bankruptcy 
law oppose merely focusing on the economic aspect of the collective proceedings. 
Professor Korobkin’s13 opinion is that bankruptcy law aims to provide answers in 
regard to all aspects of the financial distress phenomenon, including its emotional, 
political-social, moral and economic aspects. Insolvency enhances the conflict of 
interests between the parties involved. Therefore, the law attempts to provide a forum 
where interests and values can be expressed, without having to choose one of them 
the companies’ special sources of value today, and in doing so, singles out the special 
relationships that the company has cultivated with its clients, etc. 
13 See D. R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 
supra note 3. For a later presentation of this approach, in the broader context of the 
place of theoretical analysis in bankruptcy literature, see D. R. Korobkin, The Role of 
Normative Theory in Bankruptcy Debates, supra note 3.
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exclusively.14 As Professor Warren15 emphasizes, in contrast to the advocates of the 
economic approach, whose sole aim is to enlarge the value paid to the creditors in the 
event of insolvency, the advocates of the social approaches stress the numerous aims 
and values that form the basis of bankruptcy law. 
Warren claims that the main aim of bankruptcy law is the distributive consideration: 
As the losses of the failed business have to be distributed anyway, the main question 
of the law is, how to distribute those losses? She claims that there are different kinds 
of values that must be taken into account when deciding the distribution scheme, and 
none of the values outweigh each other.
The criticism of the economic approach16 emphasizes that it is wrong to expect that 
contractual solutions will reach better and more efficient results than the arrangements 
which are forced upon the parties by law. In this regard, the literature stresses three 
central considerations: 
1. Confusion between form and content: From the point of view of the parties to 
the dispute, the main question is: What is the content of the applied 
arrangement, as opposed to its source, whether contract or law. 
2. Effect on third parties: In the case of insolvency, every agreement between the 
debtor and one of his creditors affects the other creditors. The advocates of 
14 Recently, Korobkin has broadened the approach that views bankruptcy 
proceedings as a “stage” for expressing the different conflicts of interest, which in 
light of the insolvency, cannot be bridged. In this analysis, Korobkin draws a 
comparison between the legal system and the performing arts and points out the 
importance of the judicial process as one which gives rise to the expression of 
different basic insights, which determine the society we live in. In this sense, 
bankruptcy law is an essential mechanism for dealing with loss and failure. See D. R. 
Korobkin, Bankruptcy Law, Ritual and Performance, supra note 3.
15 See Warren, supra note 3. For Baird’s response to Warren, see Baird, Loss 
Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. 
815 (1987). In a later work, Warren presents an empirical analysis which portrays the 
complexity of insolvency procedures and the impossibility of reaching a clear, one-
dimensional conclusion as to the aims of the proceedings, see E. Warren & J. L. 
Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, supra note 3. 
Elsewhere, the author discusses her approach in the context of the reform that has 
recently taken place in the 9th article of the U.C.C. See E.Warren, Making Policy with 
Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debate, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1373 
(1997).
16 S. Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, supra note 3.
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bankruptcy law, who rely on settlement and contracts, disregard the effect of 
such contracts on the other creditors who were not parties to the contracts. 
3. Costs of the agreement: The assumption that it is cheaper to agree upon a 
settlement and a solution rather than to utilize the legal mechanism is wrong, 
since also the contractual arrangement and its execution involve extremely 
substantial costs, which are higher than the cost of implementing the law.   
2. Procedural Aims vs. Substantive Aims
An additional conflict that arises from the different approaches revolves around the 
issue of classifying these laws. According to one of the approaches, bankruptcy laws 
supply, first and foremost, a mechanism for collecting debts, and therefore, they 
belong in the field of procedural law.17 According to the other view, bankruptcy laws 
seek to supply effective mechanisms for restoring the company’s economic resources 
to lucrative business activity.18 Among other things, reorganization law attempts to 
give a failed business another opportunity. In order to achieve such rehabilitative 
goals,19 bankruptcy laws must completely reorganize all of the company’s legal 
liabilities. In other words, bankruptcy laws are part of the fields of substantive law, 
which define and formulate individuals’ rights, and do not solely provide the 
mechanism used to enforce these rights.   
This dilemma between the procedural categorization and the substantive one of 
bankruptcy laws directly affects the contents of the law: Scholars who uphold the 
procedural classification will emphasize that the liquidation laws must avoid 
“redistributing” the layout of the essential rights. As any procedural mechanism, the 
liquidation laws must remain loyal to the rights that existed before the event of 
17 For a radical expression of this approach, see C.W. Mooney, A Normative 
Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (is) Civil Procedure, (Research Paper 03-
27, Institute for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania, August 2003).
18 For an expression of this approach, see Korobkin, supra note 13. 
19 The judicial decisions recurrently emphasize the rehabilitation goals of 
bankruptcy proceedings. See Miller v. United States, 363 F.3d 999 (March, 2004); In 
re Dicey, 2004 BNH 15 (May, 2004); Estate of Harris v. Dawley, 312 B.R. 765 
(April, 2004); Mt. McKinley Ins. Co. v. Corning Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4295; 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 299 B.R. 732 
August, 2003).
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insolvency, and limit themselves to enforcing these existing rights.20 In contrast, 
scholars who advocate the substantive classification will emphasize the vital necessity 
in reorganizing the rights to the company’s assets, in order to enable the realization of 
the substantive goals of the procedure. In particular, in order to enable the 
reorganization of the company, there must be no immediate enforcement of some of 
the original rights which existed before the event of insolvency.21
It is interesting to note that in the past, this dichotomy in regard to the classification 
of bankruptcy law was closely bound with the conflict between the economic and 
social approaches. The supporters of the economic view identified with the 
procedural classification, while the supporters of the social view were inclined 
towards the substantive classification of these laws. Therefore, it was the advocates of 
the economic analysis who so vehemently opposed the reorganization arrangement of 
the company, since every reorganization plan involves a certain degree of violation of 
prior entitlements, and of the priority rules that govern the distribution of the 
company’s assets in liquidation proceedings.22
As such, for example, an essential pre-condition for the company to return to its 
lucrative activity is the minimization of its outstanding debt; however, the lessening 
of the burden of outstanding debt is only possible after a process in which some of 
the creditors waive their debts, in exchange for other rights in the rehabilitated 
company. In other words, reorganization plans involve the reconstruction of the 
company’s capital structure, such that some of the creditors will have no choice but 
to exchange their loans or bonds for stock or options in the reorganized company, 
while the exchange alters the arrangement of the original, substantive rights the 
creditors had prior to the event of insolvency.23 In a similar manner, the 
20 This is Jackson’s view in his book. See Jackson, supra note 4.
21 The most radical expression of stalling the enforcement of original rights is 
found in denying the secured creditors their right to immediately enforce their security 
interests. For the effect of reorganization on the rights of secured creditors to 
immediate foreclosure see infra para. 4.2.
22 See L. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 
Harv.L.Rev. 775 (1988); L. Bebchuk & H.Chang, Bargaining and the Division of 
Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 J.L. Econ. & Org. 253 (1992).
23 This is the feasibility requirement. See 11 U.S.C.S. section 1129(a)(11). For 
application of the feasibility requirement, see In re Wood, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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reorganization proceeding affects the distribution of claims between the different 
creditors in the company, and between them and the shareholders. Even when the law 
requires that the reorganization plan satisfy the Absolute Priority Rule, reality shows 
that the reorganization proceeding involves a certain amount of “cramdown” of the 
senior debts, to the benefit of the junior creditors and to the benefit of the 
shareholders24.  
Today, the advocates of the economic approach distance themselves from the 
procedural classification of bankruptcy law. In particularly, in another article, Baird & 
Rasmussen25 show how the Absolute Priority Rule, which dominates the priority 
orders in liquidation, is expected to produce inefficient results in the case of 
reorganization.26 Since the managers of the company before the reorganization 
procedures are the shareholders’ representatives or the shareholders themselves, the 
shareholders must receive a promise to get a “piece” in the rehabilitated company. 
Allocating a piece in the new company to the old shareholders is essential, in order to 
ensure that they will be motivated to act towards effectively rehabilitating the 
company. Furthermore, a necessary condition for reorganization is injecting new 
credit into a failed business. Baird & Rasmussen show that the shareholders of the 
20083; In re Cheatham, 91 B.R. 377 (1988); In re Stapleton, 55 B.R. 716 (1985); 
Danny Thomas Props. II Ltd. Pshp. v. Beal Bank, S.B.B., 241 F.3d 959 (2001); Kane 
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (1988); In re Pikes Peak Water Co., 779 F.2d 
1456 (1985); Berkeley Fed. Bank & Trust v. Sea Garden Motel & Apts. (In re Sea 
Garden Motel & Apts.), 195 B.R. 294 (1996).
24 See Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 22, and the references therein.
25 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11.
26 It is interesting to note that these developments reflect the intellectual 
development of Professor Baird himself. At the beginning, Baird joined Jackson and 
developed the argument that there is no economic justification to reorganize 
companies since it is possible to realize the going concern value by selling the 
business to a third party in liquidation. In light of the redistributive effect involved in 
reorganization, Baird claimed that this proceeding must be avoided. See D. G. Baird, 
The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. Legal Stud. 127 (1986). At a 
later point in time, Baird joined Rasmussen in an article that advocated 
reorganizations and the avoidance of the absolute priority rule. See Baird & Jackson, 
supra note 4. Finally, the two embarked on an additional article that ostensibly seems 
to contradict the previous one, and argue that there is no longer any justification for 
the existent bankruptcy law. In this article, the authors emphasize that the railroads 
can no longer be used as the guiding example, since the circumstances of that case are 
substantially different from the circumstances that revolve around most of the cases of 
insolvency today. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 2.
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company are the best candidates for investing more money in a failed business. In 
contrast to other investors, who fear the past failures of the company, the existing 
shareholders are aware of the company’s potential value and therefore willing to 
provide the financial sources needed to rehabilitate the company. In order to motivate 
the shareholders to continue investing in the company, they must be partners to the 
increase of the company’s value, which results from the reorganization, i.e., there 
must be a deviation from the absolute preference of the creditors over the 
shareholders. 
3. Micro-Economic Aims vs. Macro-Economic Aims
Until now, we assumed that an event of insolvency is a specific event for the 
individual company, which affects only the creditors and shareholders of that 
company. In the past, events of insolvency were perceived as merely micro-economic 
phenomena, and the bankruptcy laws were perceived as part of the private law. 
However, over the passage of time, reality overturned this underlying assumption. 
The economic crisis of the 1920’s showed that at times, a company can reach the 
point of insolvency due to macro-economic factors which affect the entire market, 
leaving the individual company without control over the situation. In a comprehensive 
situation of crisis, many companies will become insolvent, without any control over 
the situation.27
From the macro-economic point of view, there should be an attempt to reorganize 
failed businesses. According to the modern macro-economic approaches, the 
government and legal systems should interfere in times of depression. The authorities 
must take steps that will ultimately lead to the awakening of the economy and the 
27 Indeed, the Bankruptcy Act was enacted in 1939, after the economic crisis of 
1929, and as a part of the New Deal. Thus, an example of this justification can be 
found in Congress’s explanatory notes to the American Bankruptcy Act, where the 
aims of bankruptcy are presented as follows: “…protect the investing public, protect 
jobs, and help save troubled businesses.” 124 Congress Rec. 33990 (October 5, 1978). 
These words teach us that the framers of the law took into consideration not only the 
interests of the immediate parties connected to the company, but also the interests of 
the general public, i.e., the comprehensive effect of the power that one of the creditors 
is expected to have in order to bring about the closure of the business. For the history 
of the Bankruptcy Act, see H.R. Miller & S.Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 
Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-
First Century? 78 Am. Bankr. L.J. 153 (2004).
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solution to the crisis. Otherwise, the economic crisis could deepen, in a manner 
similar to a “snowball” effect, hence causing the downfall of the one company to lead 
to the downfall of many other businesses, and so forth.
The reorganization of failed companies is desirable, because it contributes to limiting
the crisis, while liquidation is undesirable, since it encourages the “snowball.”28 When 
a company is liquidated, its assets are put on a quasi “public auction” on the market, 
and its employees are ejected outside of the workforce. As long as the insolvency 
phenomenon is specific, these occurrences have no macro-economic effect. However, 
when the market is in a crisis, many companies reach insolvency and liquidation 
simultaneously. Great numbers of assets are put up for sale and many employees are 
discharged from the workforce. The liquidation proceedings intensify the economic 
crisis: Realizing the assets contributes to the drop in the market prices of the 
economic resources, and the discharge of the employees from the workforce 
contributes to further minimizing the aggregate demand. 
In contrast, reorganization contributes to moderating the economic crisis: The actual 
postponement in realizing the companies’ assets and discharging the employees into 
the market in fact supplies the time necessary to recover from the crisis. Likewise, in 
the event that the reorganization attempt succeeds, and the company returns to 
lucrative business activity, the realization of the companies’ assets is avoided and the 
employees remain in the workforce. Finally, when dealing with relatively large 
companies which have relatively large liabilities, settlements made with banks to 
delay due dates and to perfect terms of credit are multi-partied arrangements, in which 
not only the failing company’s direct creditors take part, but also the creditors of the 
banks themselves. Thus, the chain effect in which the one company’s insolvency leads 
many other companies into insolvency, and so forth, is avoided.     
28 This argument was first introduced by Miller & Waisman, id.. One may find 
some variations of this argument in R.B. Chapman, Missing Persons: Social Science 
and Accounting for Race, Gender, Class, and Marriage in Bankruptcy, supra note 3; 
see also M. Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and 
Macroeconomics, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1215 (1993); Macro-Economic Changes from 
Centralized to Market Economies: Big Bang v. Gradual Change: Big Bang and
Decision Making: What Went Wrong, 13 B.U. Int'l L.J. 435 (1995).
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PART II: INEFFICIENT ENTITLEMENTS AND LEGAL COERCION
1. General
The above discussion of conflicting views of bankruptcy law demonstrates how all of 
these views share the premise that efficiency considerations reconcile with the 
preservation and the enforcement of prior entitlements. Jackson’s Logic and Limits of 
Bankruptcy Law29 limits the interventionist effect of bankruptcy law to the resolution 
of the “common pool” problem. Schwartz’s Contractual Bankruptcy Law30
emphasizes the efficiency value of enforcing the pre-determined contracts regarding 
the allocation of insolvency risks. Baird & Rasmussen’s End of Bankruptcy31
highlights the decline of firm-specific assets as a justification for avoiding the 
redistributive effect of reorganization. While the social theories call for alternative 
solutions, they all rely on policy considerations that are not related to efficiency. 
Warren emphasizes the rehabilitating and distributive values of bankruptcy law.32
Korobkin emphasizes the need to provide the parties who suffer the losses of 
insolvency the right to express their frustration in order to reach collective solutions.33
Accordingly, the debate remains loyal to the traditional conflict between efficiency 
oriented laws and legal arrangements that aim at optimizing distributive justice. 
This accepted starting point relies on two major normative considerations: First, the 
enforcement of contractual arrangements is necessary in order to enable efficient 
planning of credit transactions by solvent companies. When creditors ex ante expect 
that in case of insolvency, they will remain unpaid, they should increase their interest 
rate and/or subordinate the company to more restrictive covenants. Furthermore, any 
form of uncertainty that is involved in the expected results of bankruptcy proceedings 
is reflected in higher risks and higher costs of finance. Thus, ex post intervention of 
the bankruptcy courts with prior entitlements increases the cost of capital ex ante, to 
the detriment of solvent companies and their shareholders. To avoid this effect, the 
bankruptcy courts should refrain from coercive interference with existing 
entitlements, and settle for enforcing the pre-planned allocation of insolvency risks. 
29 Jackson, supra note 4.
30 Schwartz, supra note 2.
31 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 2.
32 Warren, supra note 3. 
33 Korobkin, supra note 3.
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Second, when none of the parties can expect the court to alter the existing 
entitlements in his or her favor, they will be encouraged to manage an efficient 
process of renegotiation. Inefficient contracts and liabilities would be transformed 
upon the parties’ better understanding of the relevant needs. 
Nevertheless, any acquaintance with the practical reality of insolvency cases teaches 
that while the above policy considerations are powerful, they cannot fully exhaust the 
relevant efficiency-oriented considerations. In many cases, corporations reach 
financial distress because they had engaged in contracts and liabilities that drove the 
business into inefficient activities. These corporations file for reorganization after 
they already failed in their efforts to renegotiate their contracts with the company’s 
creditors, e.g., lenders, employees, vendors and customers. In real world cases, 
companies do not go bankrupt when they reach insolvency, but rather, when they 
cannot acquire new financial resources to meet their current liabilities. They fail in 
their efforts to raise the new capital because of the existing inefficient entitlements: 
Every potential new investor expects that after the company would fulfill its current 
liabilities,  no resources will remain to cover his or her new debt, or to provide him or 
her with positive returns on equity investment.34 Under these conditions, bankruptcy 
law can never fully enforce the existing entitlements, and the above policy 
considerations cannot be fully upheld. Furthermore, even if some of the company’s 
creditors have contracted ex ante for the allocation of insolvency risks, the full 
enforcement of these contracts in bankruptcy proceedings will usually decrease, rather 
than increase, the aggregate value to all other creditors.35  In other words, some of the 
agreements between the company and its creditors for the allocation of insolvency 
risks may involve inefficient entitlements. Then, in order to shift the company assets 
back to lucrative activity, some contractual provisions must be avoided. 
34 In many cases, bankruptcy proceedings are essential for obtaining the 
necessary credit for maintaining the business activity. See infra para. 4.2.
35 For example, secured creditors ex ante contract for immediate foreclosure 
upon the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. Nevertheless, an immediate sale 
of assets may obstruct the survival of the going concern. If the going concern value is 
higher than the assets' value, then the full enforcement of the rights of secured 
creditors would decrease the aggregate value of the bankrupt estate. Accordingly, 
Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Act subordinates the secured creditors to the automatic 
stay. See 11 USC Section 362. 
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The more challenging task is to translate this sad reality into a theoretical framework 
of bankruptcy law. For this purpose, one must inquire into the sources of inefficient 
entitlements and into the reasons for the failure of the renegotiation process.
2. The Meaning and Sources of Inefficient Entitlements
Inefficient entitlements are ones that drive the company into sub-optimal actions, i.e., 
actions that reduce the aggregate value of the corporation below its optimal value, and 
which the company would not have undertaken unless it previously provided one or 
more of its shareholders or creditors with the prior entitlement. This means that 
inefficient entitlements are characterized by two elements: First, their yielding future 
sub-optimal activity; and second, a causation relationship between the entitlement 
and the future activity (FIGURE No. 1 presents this chain of events on the time-axis).
FIGURE No. 1: The Chain of Events on the Time-Axis
How can a contract at some earlier time-point, t0, yield a sub-optimal activity at some 
later time-point, tn? The answer to this question stems from the gap between the 
expected profitability of the contract, ex ante, and its actual profitability, ex post, and 
from the impact of the non-profitable contract on the future activities of the company. 
When the company enters into the initial contract, it expects this contract to be 
profitable. The company measures the expected profitability of the contract by its 
expected returns, i.e., it relies on a probability analysis of all possible factors, which 
may affect profitability. For example, when the company employs a new employee, it 
expects that his or her contribution to the company’s value will exceed the costs of 
employment. When the expected contribution is unknown, the company estimates the 
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probability distribution over all possible scenarios, and then sums up the products of 
the probability values multiplied by the expected cash flow under each of the probable 
events. 
Then, ex post, only one of the expected scenarios turns into reality. By definition, the 
real contribution of the contract would usually be different from the expected value.36
If the real contribution of the contract is substantially lower than the expected value –
the contract may be revealed to be non-profitable. For example, if the employee’s 
contribution is significantly lower than the expected one, then the employment of this 
particular employee is non-profitable.37 A contract may also be revealed to be non-
profitable due to macro-economic events. For example, in the context of employment, 
the boom of the hi-tech industry towards the end of the last century led to a dramatic 
increase in the average salary of software developers. Then, alongside the collapse of 
this industry during 2002, the average salary  dropped dramatically. As a result, 
companies that hired developers in 1999 and in 2000, found themselves bound by 
sub-optimal contracts in 2002.38
Apparently, the non-profitable contract only involves distributive effects. For 
example, in the context of employment, it appears that the negative returns of the 
company stand against the abnormal positive returns of the employees, such that the 
aggregate efficiency remains unchanged. Deeper reflection reveals, however, that 
36 The following simplistic example clarifies this point: Assume that a company 
employs a sales agent to market new products. The employment contract is made 
under uncertainty, both as to the actual demand for the new product, and as to the 
capability of the sales agent. For simplicity assume that the expectation value is 
calculated according to the following possible scenarios: 1. under the first scenario, 
both the demand for the product and the agent are favorable. Then, the firm would 
earn from this agent's sales a value of 10; 2. Under the second scenario, either the 
agent or the demand are less favorable, and therefore, the firm would earn only 5; 3. 
Finally, under the last scenario, the actual demand is much lower than expected, and 
therefore, the firm's value from the sales is reduced to zero. If all scenarios are equally 
probable, then, the expected value is 5. The firm would be willing to pay the agent a 
salary of 2. Now, if the third scenario is the one that materializes, then, the contract is 
revealed to be non-profitable.  
37 Indeed, the parties may contract against the pessimistic events, but as will 
become apparent in the following discussion, any form of defense measure against the 
risks of sub-optimal contracts is inherently incomplete and involves costs.
38 While these firms could theoretically dismiss these employees, the termination 
of employment contracts involves tremendous costs.
Bankruptcy Law and Inefficient Entitlements, Dr. Irit Haviv-Segal ©, October 2004
21
non-profitable contracts may drive the company into inefficient activities. For 
example, the excessive employment costs may drive the company to reduce its 
investment in new technologies or in new products. Because this company continually 
competes against other similar companies over potential investors, it must retain a 
competitive level of net returns. Thus, if the company engages in too high costs of 
human capital, it must reduce its other costs.39 In the long run, the sub-optimal 
investment may result in sub-optimal returns.  
In sum, non-profitable contracts lead to sub-optimal activities because they influence 
the subsequent decisions of the company and because they may distort the incentives 
of the company incumbents to maximize the aggregate returns.40 The following 
examples demonstrate concrete cases of inefficient entitlements: 
a. Unreasonable burden of debt: At times the company is led, either by 
choice or otherwise, into a situation in which its burden of debt is 
incredibly high. The high leverage ratio is likely to lead to inefficient 
activity, since the company is acting under immediate pressures to pay 
its outstanding debt.
b. Substantial alterations in interest rates: The economy-wide factor of 
interest rates affects the company. Interest rates change from time to 
time, while affecting the advantageousness of the company’s existing 
loans. In the event that the interest rate drops substantially below the 
interest rates of the company’s loans, the cost of the company’s credit 
becomes “excessively expensive.” The company is forced to pay 
higher interest rates than it could have attained through a current credit 
39 Otherwise, the company will not be able to compete with other players over 
new investments. 
40 Indeed, the law does not support the possibility of adapting a contract to new 
events and realities. Contract law states that a mistake as to the profitability of a 
contract will not justify the nullification of the contract. See Louisiana Power & Light 
Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Industries, 517 F. Supp. 1319 (1981); Wooldridge v. Exxon 
Corp., 473 A.2d 1254 (1984); L-J, Inc. v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 270 
S.C. 413 (1978); Hill v. A.O. Smith Corp., 801 F.2d 217 (1986). All of these cases 
rely on the doctrine requiring that the mistake refer to past or present facts, which 
already exist at the time the contract is made. A mistake cannot refer to erroneous 
predictions of the parties concerning future facts.  
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transaction. High credit costs are likely to lessen the company’s 
competitive power in the market. The company will be forced to sell 
its products at higher prices than its competitors, or be satisfied with 
smaller profits. In any event, minimizing the profitability is expected to 
lessen the shareholders’ incentives to continue investing in the 
company. 
c. Gradual growth over time, beyond expected, in the total value of 
required investments: Despite the attempts of the company’s captains 
to foresee and correctly estimate the costs of development, production 
and operation at the outset, reality can sometimes surprise them. In 
many cases, these costs will be higher than expected. Then, the 
company will be bound to enlarge its fixed liabilities beyond the pre-
planned value. Higher costs are likely to cause inefficient utilization of 
the company’s assets: The company’s management is likely to be 
swayed by its interest to minimize those costs, even at the price of 
deviating from the original operation plan. In other cases, the 
heightened costs could lead to the company needing to raise additional 
capital, under less comfortable conditions than the original ones, etc.
d. Development of inefficient control: Corporate control is determined 
according to the holdings of its share-capital. The guiding principle 
places the control in the hands of the shareholder who holds more than 
50% of the company’s shares. In many cases this principle can lead the 
company into an inefficient control. Thus, for example, the controlling 
group may be comprised of a number of shareholders who suffer from 
major disagreements and coordination problems. Another example is 
the struggle for power among the founders of a start-up company and 
its investors, which is likely to lead to inefficient decisions. In general, 
the collective action problems may thwart the efficient management of 
the assets.
e. Substantial alterations in the supply and demand for the business’s 
workers: An additional factor related to the efficient operation of the 
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company is that of employment contracts. The employment conditions 
are decided upon with each employee according to the conditions of 
the relevant job market at the beginning of the employment. As a 
result, substantial changes in the relevant job market are expected to 
affect profitability and efficiency. Thus, for example, should the 
customary employment conditions of the market deteriorate, after the 
employment of some of the workers, and assuming that the company is 
bound to the original salary agreements, the company will be in a 
position in which the costs of its workforce are substantially higher 
than the same costs of competitor companies. Naturally, the company 
will seek to be released from its current employment contracts, 
however it will not always succeed in doing so. Crucial workers in the 
company will tend to insist on the continuance of their original 
employment conditions. Likewise, in the event that the workers are 
organized, the task of altering the employment conditions will be made 
more difficult.
f. Substantial negative deviation from the expected income of the 
company and its income in actual fact: An additional source of 
inefficiency in operating the company’s assets is related to the demand 
for the company’s products. Long-term changes may lower the demand 
for the company products: Novel technologies annul the demand for 
old technologies. Changes in the course of business activity revoke the 
need for certain products and services, and create demand for new 
products and services. The passing of generations and changes in 
consumption habits cancel certain products and create demand for new 
products. 
In some cases, the company will succeed in adapting its production 
channels to the dynamic reality, and will succeed in retaining efficient 
activity. In other cases, the company will not be successful. In these 
cases, efficiency dictates the release of the assets from the existing 
arrangement of liabilities, whether by selling the assets piecemeal, so 
that every buyer makes different use of them; or by selling the assets 
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as a “going concern” to a buyer who will be able to make the 
necessary adjustments in the company’s products. Nevertheless, 
incumbents may object this sale for personal reasons that are not 
associated with efficiency considerations.
g. Macro-economic changes in the economy’s situation: Finally, macro-
economic changes are expected to affect the advantageousness of the 
existing activity in the company. The salient example of this in the 
Israeli economy is that of tourism, which was severely harmed as a 
result of the outbreak of the second Intifada, and has not yet recovered. 
Most probably, many investors would never have invested in this field 
had they been able to foresee these developments.
On a higher level of abstraction, inefficient entitlements may emerge from one or more 
of the following three potential sources:
a. Non-profitable Contracts: The major source of financial distress 
concerns the sub-optimal conditions of the company’s liabilities. A too 
high leverage ratio, or, sub-optimal employment contract, or, sub-
optimal interest rates are examples of this possibility. Under these 
conditions, the sub-optimal contracts deter potential investors, because 
these investors expect that after the company would comply with its 
current liabilities, there would be no value left for the new investors 
(hereinafter, the First Source of inefficiency).
b. Inefficient control: The second possibility is that problems in the 
company’s management or its control are preventing it from lucrative 
activity (hereinafter, the Second Source of inefficiency).
c. The lack of potential cash-flow: Finally, it is also possible that 
changes in the times and customs are what led to the decrease in the 
demand for the company’s products, or that the price of manufacturing 
these items rose drastically, hence diminishing the stream of income 
(hereinafter, the Third Source of inefficiency).
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Fixed liabilities, by their nature, endanger the efficient activity of the company, since 
they limit its ability to adjust to dynamic business reality. The contents of the fixed 
liabilities are designed on the basis of information that is in the hands of the parties at 
the time of their creation; however, a reality different from what the parties originally 
expected may be revealed when actually executing the commitment. The gap between 
the parties’ expectations at the time of the creation of the fixed liabilities and the 
business reality that is exposed at the point of their execution, may turn the existing 
arrangement of liabilities into non-profitable ones. The lack of profitability may lead 
the company to new decisions and actions, which reduce the long-run aggregate value 
of the company.
Therefore, if it were possible, companies would completely avoid entering into fixed 
liabilities, and they would offer all of its parties some share in the aggregate proceeds. 
In actual fact, avoiding fixed liabilities is impossible, and is not necessarily the most 
efficient choice for the company. Firstly, there are contracting parties who would not 
agree to residual consideration. Amongst these are banks, the company’s employees,41
its suppliers,42 and consumers.43 Even if these investors would agree to stipulations 
that would make the company’s liabilities towards them more flexible, these 
stipulations would remain marginal without changing the comprehensive character of 
the contract. The company is therefore forced to bind itself in a fixed commitment 
upfront, whether it likes it or not. Secondly, a residual claim against the company’s 
assets is usually related to the investor’s power to influence decision making in the 
company.44 Thus, for example, it is the shareholders who appoint the company’s 
directors and managers, and control the decision-making. Other investors as well will 
tend to condition the flexibility of the contract with them on their power to affect the 
41 The vast majority of the employees would like to receive a fixed salary that is 
independent of the business’ returns. 
42 Suppliers would usually require fixed prices that are independent of the 
company’s returns.  
43 Consumers would expect the company to demand some fixed price for its 
product. While the prices may change over time, they by no means depend on the 
corporation’s returns. 
44 For the connection between residual claims and corporate control, see H. 
Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise, (1996);  H. Hansmann & R. Kraakman,
The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 Yale L.J. 387 (2000).
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decision making in the company. Broadening the number of residual claims entails 
broadening the number of individuals who take part in the decision-making process of 
the company. This broadening is likely to lead the company into stagnation and the 
inability to operate.
In other words, every form of contracting with the company may lead to an 
arrangement of claims that will thwart the efficient operation of the company’s assets: 
Fixed claims threaten to limit the company’s flexibility and ability to adjust itself to 
dynamic business reality; residual claims, like stock, threaten to create an inefficient 
arrangement of decision-making in the company. Throughout its activity, the 
company attempts to balance between its possible types of inefficiency and vary the 
kinds of claims made against the company. The company balances between collecting 
capital through loans and collecting capital through issuing shares; likewise, the 
company can include stipulations in its contracts with the different claimants, thus 
making the contracts more flexible to change in the dynamic reality. However, this 
attempt to balance between the different types of inefficiency does not always succeed 
in leading to the efficient management of the company’s assets. Whether due to the 
lack of choice, a case of misjudgment, or as a result of unforeseeable events, the 
company may be led into a situation in which it will be bound by inefficient contracts. 
In such a case, releasing the assets from the existing arrangement of liabilities is vital 
in order to bring the assets back to lucrative activity.
3. The Failure of the Renegotiation Process
When an inefficient arrangement of liabilities against the company is formed, the 
problem can be solved in one of two ways: The first option is that the parties reach 
new contracts that nullify the original ones. Then, with a degree of commercial 
flexibility (“give and take”), the parties will succeed in returning the assets to sound 
activity without involving the courts. The second option is that changing the existing 
arrangement of liabilities will be done either by the reorganization or by the 
liquidation proceedings. Then, the court will enjoin the parties to make the changes 
necessary to bring the assets back to sound activity.
The discussion in the following paragraphs shows how agreed solutions to 
inefficiency are preferred over solutions that are forced upon the parties by the court. 
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Therefore, the discussion will show that reorganization or liquidation should become 
relevant alternatives only after the parties failed to solve the inefficiency 
independently, through redesigning their mutual contracts.45
There are many reasons why the efficient solution cannot always be reached through 
agreement: In some cases, coordination and cooperation difficulties arise. All of the 
claimants in the company are expected to enjoy an improvement in the existing 
arrangement of liabilities against the company; however, naturally, every investor 
prefers that the other investors will be those affected by the changes. Thus, for 
example, a lender of the company will prefer to continue to receive the interest that 
was agreed upon in the loan contract, also when the contractual rate is higher than the 
market’s, by way of expecting that the company’s other creditors will agree to 
minimize their claims upon the company. Thus, also when the company is in need of 
new sources of funding, every shareholder will prefer that the other shareholders will 
continue to invest further resources in the company, in order to enable it to continue to 
operate. Finally, if new employment contracts are necessary for the change, every 
worker will prefer that the company’s other workers will be those that will be 
subjected to the alteration in their employment conditions, while he remains employed 
in the company according to the original employment conditions.  
When the company’s assets are led into inefficient activity, the conflicts of interest 
between the creditors and the shareholders intensify. Inefficiency causes losses, and 
these are passed on to either the shareholders or the creditors. The party that is harmed 
from the inefficiency will ask to alter the existing arrangement of liabilities, while the 
unharmed party will insist on retaining the status quo. Indeed, it will usually be the 
shareholders who will ask to change the existing arrangement of liabilities, in order to 
encourage the return of the assets to sound activity. Thus, for example, when the 
inefficiency is caused by excessively high salaries, the controlling shareholders will 
45 Under particular circumstances, the debtor’s effort to renegotiate his liabilities 
is considered to be a pre-requirement for establishing good faith. See East v. Educ. 
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re East), 270 B.R. 485 (October, 2001) (Discussing the duty 
of former students to make an effort to renegotiate their student loans, before they file 
for bankruptcy); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Mort (In re Mort), 272 B.R. 181 
(January, 2002); In re Conner, 89 B.R. 744 (august, 1988); Stern v. Educ. Res. Inst. 
Inc. (In re Stern), 288 B.R. 36 (December, 2002); East v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. 
(In re East), 270 B.R. 485 (October, 2001).  
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try to hold an additional round of bargaining in an attempt to lessen the value of the 
comprehensive liabilities towards the workers. Naturally, the workers will try to reject 
the controlling shareholders’ claim, and they will succeed in doing so according to the 
degree of dependency that the company has on the workers’ identities and according 
to the degree of the workers organization. As long as the company’s workers succeed 
in preventing alterations to the employment conditions, they are likely to drag the 
company’s assets into inefficient activity, dictated by the workers’ interests and not 
according to the aggregated efficiency test. 
In exceptional cases, it will be the company’s creditors who will ask to change the 
existing arrangement of liabilities, and the shareholders who will refuse to cooperate 
with them. This situation may occur when the company takes out an additional loan 
from a later creditor, thus diluting the rights of the earlier creditors.46 When the 
comprehensive burden of loans creates substantial dangers of insolvency, the earlier 
creditors will ask that the company direct its efforts to minimizing the credit burden. 
In these cases, the shareholders may refuse to cooperate with the earlier creditors, 
since they benefit from the later credit, despite its inefficiency.
4. Financial Distress
Inefficient liabilities threaten to lead the company to financial distress: on the one 
hand, they reduce the company’s returns, and thereby, increase the company’s needs 
for new funding; and on the other hand, they reduce the incentives of new investors to 
provide the company with new financial resources. As a result, after a while, the 
inefficient liabilities may lead to a situation where the company lacks the necessary 
finance to meet its current debts. 
46 For the problem of creditors' dilution, see Clifford W. Smith, Jr., & Jerold B. 
Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7. J. Fin. Econ. 
117 (1979). See also G.G. Triantis & R.J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive 
Corporate Governance, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 1073 (1995); R.C. Picker, Security Interests, 
Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 645 (1992); R.E.Scott, A 
Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901 (1986); A Schwarts, 
Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1396 (1997); H.B. 
Shadab, Interpreting Indentures: How Disequilibrium Economics and Financial Asset 
Specifically Support Narrow Interpretation, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 763 (2002).
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This means that the renegotiation process with prior creditors takes place, when the 
company is under a time pressure. If the company fails to renegotiate its contracts 
before it reaches financial distress, it would be in default towards some of its 
creditors. The time pressure reduces the negotiating power of the company: Usually, 
the parties who are more pressured to complete the negotiation would agree to less 
favorable terms. In other words, the threat of financial distress reduces the practical 
capability of the company to complete the necessary renegotiation processes in order 
to shift the company’s assets back to lucrative activity. 
5. The Justification of Coercive Interference with Existing Entitlements
When the company engages in inefficient entitlements, these entitlements burden the 
lucrative business activity. Efficiency requires that the assets be severed from these 
entitlements, in order to shift the assets back to efficient activity.47 If this solution 
cannot be maintained by negotiation and contract, there must exist some procedure for 
enforcing this solution on the parties. Otherwise, the perpetuated inefficiencies would 
increase the losses incurred by the inefficient entitlements.
PART III. THE ROLE AND CONTENT OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
1.General
We can now present the conditions for the commencement of bankruptcy, and the role 
of bankruptcy law: Our main claim is that when the following three accumulative 
conditions are fulfilled, there is a justification for severing the company’s assets 
from the existing arrangement of liabilities. The aim of collective collection 
proceedings is to bring about this essential severance, whether by way of 
reorganization or by way of liquidation, in order to reinstate the company’s 
lucrative business activity.
47 The reader may wonder how do we distinguish between "assets" and 
"entitlements"? In the legal context, the two concepts seem to overlap, because the 
one party's contractual entitlement against some other contractual party may be a part 
of his or her assets, and vice versa. In the economic context, the two concepts are 
separate: Assets exist in the world, in disregard of their distribution to human beings. 
Thus, one may identify these "assets" by exploring into their existence, in a world 
where all human rights and possessions had disappeared. If the asset in question 
would have continued to survive, in the absence of human rights and possessions, 
then, it is an asset, and not merely an entitlement. If, on the other hand, the asset in 
question would have disappeared, together with all human rights and possessions, 
then, it merely reflects an entitlement.
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The three accumulative conditions are:
a. The existing arrangement of liabilities leads to inefficient exploitation 
of the company’s resources.
b. The inefficiency cannot be solved through agreement.
c. Financial distress.
Before I discuss this claim, a preliminary question must be addressed: The question is, 
why is a collective collection proceeding necessary in order to change the existing 
arrangement of liabilities, when the parties fail to reach the necessary change through 
agreement? In other words, why are we not able to change the existing arrangement of 
liabilities without new contracts and without liquidation or reorganization 
proceedings? The answer to this question is found in the guiding principle of contract 
law which states that “a mistake as to the profitability of the transaction cannot be 
regarded as a mutual mistake that justifies non-performance.”48
In regard to the substance of our main claim, it is sufficient that one of the three 
conditions mentioned above is not fulfilled in order for there not to be a justification 
for entering into collective collection proceedings:49 Firstly, as long as the 
arrangement of liabilities is efficient, there is no justification to change it. Both 
considerations regarding efficiency and those regarding autonomy of the individuals 
justify the continuance of the existence of the arrangement of liabilities. Secondly, as 
long as the parties can solve the inefficiency through an agreement, there is no reason 
to enter into the collective proceeding: The agreed solution is better since it is 
expected to be more efficient and it also manifests the parties’ desire. The agreed 
solution is more efficient since it encompasses lower costs than the collective 
proceeding. In addition, the parties will be able to design the new arrangement of 
liabilities better than any other external body would have been able to do so. The 
agreed solution goes hand in hand with the parties’ autonomy, since it does not 
involve the element of coercion that characterizes the collective proceeding. 
48 See supra text accompanying note 40.
49 In other words, the three conditions are essential. 
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Finally, the condition of financial distress is vital, since it correctly outlines the 
amount of time allocated to the company’s captains, in order for them to attempt to 
find a solution to the inefficiency problem by themselves. According to the 
agreements drawn up by the parties at the outset, the control of the company is given 
to the shareholders and their representatives. Among other things, their powers consist 
of the ability to change the existing arrangement of liabilities, if such a change is 
deemed necessary; they have the power to conduct negotiations with each and every 
one of the company’s investors to change the conditions of the existing contracts. As 
long as the company is successful in paying its debts on time, there is no need for the 
court or any of the creditors to intervene. The financial distress, however, indicates 
the company’s captains’ failure to reach an agreed solution, thus constituting the point 
from which the company’s creditors will be the ones that will have to bear the costs of 
the failure to reach an agreed solution. Therefore, it is the suitable milestone from 
which the responsibility for changing the existing arrangement of rights is transferred 
from the controlling shareholders to the court and the trustee.
The existence of the three conditions is sufficient in order to justify the opening of 
collective collection proceedings: Firstly, the combination of the inefficiency with the 
financial distress justifies the change of the existing arrangement of liabilities, in 
order to return the assets to lucrative business activity. The financial distress leads the 
company into a state in which it cannot implement its arrangement of liabilities, as it 
was agreed upon at the outset. Any attempt to continue the company’s activity 
without change will involve violating some of the original liabilities. The existing 
arrangement of liabilities will change anyway, since the company will breach some of 
its liabilities. At this point, redesigning the existing arrangement of liabilities through 
a collective normative system is preferable over doing so through the coincidental 
factual progression, which will develop as a result of the creditors’ desperate attempts 
to collect their debts. Secondly, in light of the failed attempt to reach an agreed 
solution without a collective proceeding, the element of coercion becomes inevitable: 
The first possibility is that the trustee would force the parties to release the assets 
from the existing arrangement of liabilities; or, that the circumstances of the factual 
progression that will develop will bring about a forced change on part of the creditors’ 
rights, since the company will not be able to pay all of its liabilities on time. Most 
probably, the arranged and guided solution of the court involves more appropriate 
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coercion and less arbitration than the coercion that will develop as a result of the 
absence of a collective proceeding. Finally, in order to reinstate efficient use of the 
company assets, it is essential that the changes in existing entitlements will be 
managed by a third party, e.g., the trustee, and not by the company controlling 
shareholders or by some of the creditors. Otherwise, the transformation of existing 
entitlements would be tuned to the interests of particular investors and not to the 
aggregate efficiency.50
2. The Essence of Collective Collection Proceedings
The collective collection proceedings release the company’s assets from the existing 
arrangement of liabilities, in order to return the assets to lucrative business activity. 
The liquidation or reorganization proceedings are expected to include one or more of 
the following ways to transform the existing arrangement of rights:51
a. Changing the structure of the commitments: The one option is that the 
discharge from prior entitlements will focus on the left side of the 
company’s balance sheet. The company’s business will continue 
operating normally, so that the company will continue to be a going 
concern, however the collective proceedings will lead to a 
reorganization of the claims against the company. Therefore, for 
example, in the event that the company reaches insolvency due to its 
leverage ratio, the capital structure will have to be reorganized in such 
a way that some of the fixed liabilities will be replaced by share equity. 
For this purpose, through the collective proceedings, some of the debts 
will be erased, and some of the creditors will receive preferred or 
50 Indeed, Baird & Rasmussen have shown that a critical phase of the collective 
proceedings concerns the shift of control from the shareholders’ representatives to the 
trustee. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 11. See also Henderson v. Casciato-
Northrup, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23637; Correll v. Equifax Check Servs., 234 B.R. 
8, 1997 (September, 1997); In re Harris, 200 B.R. 745, (September, 1996); In re 
Gray, 28 B.R. 348 (March, 1983); McRoberts v. Associates Commer. Corp. (In re 
Derickson), 226 B.R. 879, (October, 1998); First Bank & Trust v. Gross (In re 
Reid), 179 B.R. 504 (February, 1995).
51 These changes are depicted in Warren’s article, see Warren, supra note 3, at
785-86. Although the author presents bankruptcy law as a procedural proceeding for 
collecting debts that constitutes an alternative to the State’s individual collection 
proceeding, she points out that bankruptcy law changes the existing arrangement of 
rights. The court emphasized in particularly the change that the existing arrangement 
of rights undergoes with the entrance into collective collection proceedings. 
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common stock, instead of the original claims of debt. The creditors can 
be compensated for the increased risk involved in the shares, as 
opposed to the loans, by a number of shares that reflects the higher 
comprehensive nominal value.52
Additional changes in the structure of the capital are likely to be 
manifested through altering the interest rates, so that the existing 
creditors will agree to receive lower returns on their investments; or, in 
collecting new credit during the collective proceedings, so that old 
loans will be paid and exchanged with new loans. Finally, changes in 
the employment contracts with the company’s workers will also be 
classified as a part of this category. 
b. Changing the structure of control: Upon the company’s entrance into 
liquidation or reorganization proceedings, the control of the company’s 
assets is transferred from the shareholders’ representatives to the 
creditors. After the beginning of the collective proceedings, the 
structure of control of the assets will never return to what it was while 
the company was a going concern: If the company reaches liquidation, 
then its assets will be transferred to the ownership and control of other 
businesses; and if the company reaches reorganization proceedings, the 
original shareholders will be left with a lower value, so that they will 
not be able to activate the original control they possessed in the 
company’s assets.53
c. Realizing the assets: The most drastic form of severance of the 
company’s assets from its prior liabilities will occur when the 
company’s assets will be realized and sold to third parties. Selling the 
assets causes a change in the existing arrangement of liabilities against 
52 Apparently, this is the essence of reorganization, as opposed to liquidation. A 
deeper reflection reveals, however, that the transformation of current commitments 
may be accomplished by liquidation as well. Therefore, at this stage, the analysis 
remains general, and does not refer to reorganization or to liquidation. Para. 4.1. 
below discusses the distinction between liquidation and reorganization.
53 See supra note 11.
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those assets, since it severs the link that existed before the liquidation, 
between the assets and the company’s shareholders and creditors; in 
the place of this original link, a new ownership relationship between 
the buyer and the company’s assets will emerge. When the company’s 
assets are sold as a “going concern,” all of the assets are transferred to 
the ownership of a single buyer. When the sale is done “piecemeal,” 
each one of the company’s assets is distributed to a different buyer. In 
any event, the original ownership link is severed.
The collective proceedings are expected to include one or more of these categories: In 
reorganization, the claims against the company, as well as the structure of control in 
the company, are altered in order to enable the return of the assets to lucrative 
activity. In liquidation, the assets are transferred from the company to the buyer, so 
the company’s original investors no longer own them. Obviously, any severance from 
the original arrangement includes a change in substantive rights.
The type and level of severance of the company’s assets from its initial entitlements 
should be adapted to the sources of inefficiencies. The basic guideline is that we want 
to minimize the impediment of existing entitlements, and therefore, no unnecessary 
type of severance should occur. For example, if the company reaches financial
distress only because of its leverage ratio, it should undergo reorganization 
proceedings, at which a feasible capital structure would be restored. However, there is 
no justification for selling the assets to third parties.54 Similarly, if the source of 
failure is rooted in the company’s control, incumbents must be replaced. However, 
this shift of control should not lead to any alteration of the debt liabilities nor should 
the company be sold to third parties.
PART IV: CONCRETE ARRANGMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
1. The Choice between Reorganization and Liquidation
Until now, I have discussed the conditions under which there is a normative justification 
to sever the company’s assets from the arrangement of liabilities that was created in 
relation to those assets. The following question is related to choosing the correct way to 
54 See infra para. 4.1.
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release the assets from the existing rights. First, should the default procedure be the one 
of reorganization or rather the one of liquidation? Second, what should be the guiding 
policy considerations for selecting one of the two options, liquidation or reorganization? 
Positive law does not mandate an explicit examination of the choice between 
reorganization and liquidation by the bankruptcy court. Initially, the person who files 
the petition for commencement also determines the choice between the two 
proceedings.55 In particular, the debtor may file a petition for commencement, together 
with a reorganization plan.  Then, the Bankruptcy Act provides the debtor with a period 
of 100-180 days56 to lead the plan to confirmation. Once the proceedings begin, the 
collection procedures are stayed, and the debtor has a chance to reorganize the business. 
This statutory arrangement implicitly inclines towards reorganization: Because the 
debtor or the shareholders of the bankrupt firm would usually prefer reorganization, 
they would usually precede their creditors, and file the petition for commencement. 
Once they succeed to stay the collection proceedings for 100-180 days, they also gain a 
strong negotiation position that facilitates the enforcement of reorganization on all of 
the other creditors.57 Indeed, the sources of inefficiency that have led the firm into 
financial distress are addressed by the trustee and by the bankruptcy court when dealing 
with particular bankruptcy law issues, like the feasibility of capital structure, or, the 
adequate protection of secured creditors.58 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court is not 
required to condition the choice of procedure, i.e., the choice between reorganization 
and liquidation, on an inquiry into the sources of inefficiencies. As a result, many firms 
undergo reorganization proceedings, even though, they suffer from the third type of 
inefficient entitlements, and their assets should have been sold to third parties.59
55 Although, a short while after commencement, the fate of the reorganization 
effort would be determined by the capability of the trustee to obtain new credit in 
order to cover the ongoing expenses of the going concern. See, infra para. 4.2.
56 This period may be extended. See 11 USC Section 1101. Additionally, section 
362 of the Bankruptcy Acts stays the foreclosure of security interests for nine months.
57 Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 22.
58 See infra para. 4.2.
59 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control -- Systems Failure Under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 57 Am. Bankr. L.J. 99 (1983). 
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Traditional law and economics, on the other hand, supports liquidation, and recurrently 
claims against reorganization:60 In 1981, Professor Baird presented the Uneasy Case of 
Corporate Reorganizations.61 In this essay, Baird presented the possibility of selling the 
bankrupt going-concern to a third party in liquidation proceedings as a justification for 
reformulating the choice between the two options. Traditionally, corporate liquidations 
were associated with selling the corporate assets piecemeal, whereas, corporate 
reorganizations were associated with maintaining the going concern. Accordingly, 
reorganizations were considered the accurate choice, when the value of the going 
concern was higher than the value of the assets, when sold in parts. Nevertheless, as 
Baird indicated, if the going concern can be sold in liquidation proceedings, then, its 
excess value cannot be deemed sufficient to support reorganization. On the contrary, 
because reorganizations involve the allocation of new claims against the unknown value 
of the reorganized firm, they inherently involve some form of redistribution and 
avoidance of existing entitlements. Thus, liquidations always remain more efficient than 
reorganizations: They succeed in providing the same aggregate value, but without 
violating prior entitlements. Baird suggested to perceive reorganizations as hypothetical 
sales of the company’s assets to their initial investors. Only when the initial investors 
are willing to invest the highest value in the corporate business, should the company 
undergo reorganization proceedings.  
Bebchuk & Chang62 pointed at the bargaining power of the shareholders in 
reorganization proceedings, as a result of their power to stay the collection proceedings 
for at least nine months. Facing the nine months delay, senior creditors would be forced 
to surrender portions of their initial entitlements. Accordingly, Bebchuk & Chang 
suggested a legal arrangement that would allow the parties to opt-out, ex ante, of the 
reorganization option. 
60 Reorganizations involve tremendous costs. See S.J. Lubben, The Direct Costs 
of Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in 
Large Chapter 11 Cases, 74 Am. Bankr. L.J. 509 (2000); Stephen J. Lubben, Some 
Realism About Reorganization: Explaining the Failure of Chapter 11 Theory, 106 
Dick. L. Rev. 267 (2001); K.A. Kordana & E.A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 
11, 74 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 161 (1999). 
61 Baird, supra note 26.
62 Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 22.
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Finally, the recent End of Bankruptcy Law63 points to the practical transformation of 
reorganization proceedings. In this essay, Baird & Rasmussen claim that contemporary 
reorganizations no longer involve the rehabilitation of failed businesses, but rather they 
become a source of opportunity for the shareholders to sell their business to a third 
party for a better price. Baird & Rasmussen suggest that because the initial justification 
of reorganizations no longer holds, bankruptcy law should settle for enforcing the pre-
formed contracts.  
The present theory does not support the positive law's implicit inclination towards 
reorganization, nor does it follow the law and economics' preference of liquidation. The 
new theory calls for a legal arrangement that would mandate a preliminary hearing, at 
which the bankruptcy court would be assigned the discretion to select the accurate 
proceedings for the particular case. This judicial hearing would save the costs involved 
in futile reorganization efforts, and would secure the correspondence between the 
judicial proceedings and the sources of inefficient entitlements. 
For example, while the legal system may help in solving the first and second sources of 
inefficiency, it cannot solve the third one. Reconstruction of current liabilities, 
avoidance of burdensome contracts, and change of control may be inflicted by the court. 
However, the legal system cannot affect in any way the demand for the corporation’s 
products, or, the costs of production. Accordingly, the third source of inefficiency can 
be resolved only by liquidation. 
The remaining question concerns the legal choice between reorganization and 
liquidation in bankruptcy cases that emerge from the first and second sources of 
inefficiency. In these cases, the traditional law and economics calls for liquidation 
proceedings in order to avoid the redistribution effects of reorganization: As Baird 
indicated, the efficient business activity can be restored by liquidation proceedings at 
which the going concern would be sold to a third party.    
The present theory challenges this argument, and calls for a more refined choice 
between the two types of procedures. The following discussion establishes this 
63 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 2.
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argument in two stages: First, I will show that it is incorrect to assume that 
reorganizations involve a more far-reaching avoidance of existing entitlements. The 
analysis will show that both types of procedures yield the severance of the bankrupt 
estate from pre-petition entitlements. Second, I will show that the degree of coercive 
interference with existing entitlements changes from one case to another. Indeed, in 
some of the cases, reorganizations would yield a more severe impact on existing 
entitlements. Nevertheless, in other cases, reorganizations would better preserve the 
initial scheme of distribution. 
 To understand this point, one must note that the pre-petition arrangement of liabilities 
involves two types of relationships:
a. The relationships between the assets and the contracting parties: Pre-
petition entitlements entail legal relationships between the company’s 
sub-set of assets and its shareholders and creditors. For example, 
existing entitlements provide the shareholder who holds over 50% of 
the company shares the right to control its assets. Similarly, existing 
entitlements entail the identity and authority of each of the company’s 
employees, thereby, entailing the actions that each employee would 
perform on behalf of the company. These actions affect the assets and 
their value. Finally, the company’s property interest in its assets 
excludes other potential holders from having any proprietary rights in 
those resources.  
b. The relationships between the contracting parties themselves: The 
existing entitlements also entail a distributive scheme between the 
company’s investors themselves. For example, traditional priority 
orders entail that the shareholders hold the residual claim against the 
company’s assets. This implies that the creditors are entitled to be paid 
in full before the shareholders gain any positive value. Similarly, the 
law states that secured creditors are entitled to be paid in full before the 
unsecured creditors recover any positive value, etc (see: FIGURE No. 
2). 
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FIGURE No. 2: Two Types of Relationships
2.a. The First Type of Relationships: Existing entitlements yield a function from 
the set of the company investors to its set of assets:
The set of investors The set of assets
2.b. The Second Type of Relationships: Existing entitlements yield a distribution 










Liquidations involve a more far-reaching avoidance of the first type of relationships: In 
reorganizations, at least some of the initial investors would continue to hold claims 
against the company assets. The corporation’s shareholders and bondholders would 
hold new securities against the reorganized company; portions of the company 
employees would continue to work for the reorganized firm; and suppliers and dealers 
would continue to work with the company. In liquidations, on the other hand, these 
relationships are totally terminated, as the assets are sold to a third party.64
Reorganizations involve a more far-reaching intervention with the second type of 
relationships, i.e., the relationships between the company investors themselves. Because 
reorganizations violate the absolute priority rule, they yield a redistribution of the initial 
claims against the company’s assets.  
64 For the emphasis on firm specific relationships as a justification for 
reorganization, see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm, supra note 
12. From this viewpoint, the perception of reorganization as a “hypothetical sale” of 
the corporation’s assets to their initial owners is flawed: This perception assumes that 
the assets were already fully detached from their owners, and then, turns to explore 
the adequate way to sell the detached assets to the highest bidder. It is dubious, 
however, why should the assets be detached from their initial investors and owners in 
the first place.  
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The level of interference with existing entitlements changes from one case to another. In 
some cases, liquidations would be more interventionist than reorganizations, and vice 
versa. Therefore, in selecting between the two options, the court must employ its 
discretion, and adapt the decision to the particular circumstances of the case. In 
particular, the following policy considerations must be taken into account:
a. The source of inefficient entitlements: The judicial examination must begin 
by an inquiry into the sources of inefficient entitlements. When dealing with 
the third source of inefficiency, the court must order liquidation. Otherwise, 
the court must turn to apply the following policy considerations.
b. The feasibility of acquisition by a third party: The abstract law and 
economics presumes that the trustee would always be able to find a third party 
buyer for the corporation’s assets or for the going concern. Nevertheless, this 
presumption does not always hold. In many concrete cases, there is no 
potential buyer who is willing to pay a reasonable price for the bankrupt 
business. Then, the only option for maintaining the going concern value would 
be reorganization. Therefore, when considering the choice between liquidation 
and reorganization, the trustee must seek potential buyers. To the extent that if 
the trustee finds a third party buyer, the court should order liquidation. 
Otherwise, the two possible solutions (reorganization and a sale to a third 
party) must be advanced simultaneously. The option that can be realized in the 
shortest period of time should be selected.
c. The uncertainty involved in the reorganization plan: While all 
reorganizations involve some level of deviation from the absolute priority rule, 
the degree of avoidance of existing entitlements changes from one case to 
another. Accordingly, in considering a reorganization plan, the court must take 
into account the level of uncertainty that is involved with the estimated value 
of the going concern after reorganization. The more uncertain the outcomes of 
the reorganization plan are, the less favorable this option becomes. High risks 
should be deemed sufficient for dismissing a reorganization plan.
Bankruptcy Law and Inefficient Entitlements, Dr. Irit Haviv-Segal ©, October 2004
41
d. The level of cooperation by the shareholders and management: Because 
reorganizations can succeed only upon the full cooperation of existing 
management and shareholders, their willingness to invest further human and 
financial resources in the reorganization plan should be taken into account. 
e. The feasibility of new credit in reorganization: The discussion below 
demonstrates that the realistic chances of the reorganization plan are best 
measured by the willingness of new investors to provide the company with 
new finance during the reorganization proceedings. Accordingly, the 
feasibility of new financial resources should also guide the court in selecting 
between reorganization and liquidation. 
f. The proportionality test: Finally, if none of the above tests fully determines 
the judicial choice of procedure, the court must turn to apply some flexible 
balancing test. The court must balance the costs of inefficiencies that would 
result from terminating the relationships between the company investors and 
its assets in liquidation, against the costs of inefficiencies that would result 
from the violation of the absolute priority rule. The results of this balancing 
test would change from one case to another.
2. Obtaining New Credit in Reorganizations65
The company commences the bankruptcy proceedings due to financial distress: Its 
shareholders and management can no longer attract new investment, and therefore, 
the company fails in its effort to obtain the necessary funding for its current activity. 
When the bankruptcy proceedings begin, the trustee must find ways to acquire new 
credit for the bankrupt business. On many occasions, the capability of the trustee to 
obtain new credit determines the practical feasibility of reorganization. Bankruptcy 
law facilitates the acquisition of new credit by enabling the trustee to provide the new 
investor with a senior position: The trustee can provide the new creditor with the 
preferential position of “administrative costs,” or provide the creditor a lien on the 
property of the estate.66 As long as the new credit is obtained in the ordinary course of 
65 N.L. Georgakopoulos, New Value, Fresh Start, Stanford Journal of Law, 
Business, and Finance, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 1996.
66 11 USC Section 364.
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business, the trustee is authorized to act without judicial approval. When the 
acquisition of the new credit is beyond the ordinary course of business, the trustee 
must precede the transaction by turning to the bankruptcy court for approval.67
The judicial interpretation of section 364 developed two tests to determine whether 
the credit is obtained in the “ordinary course of business”:68
… the first test is the creditor's expectation, or the vertical test. It 
asks whether a reasonable creditor would view the transaction as 
deviating from the debtor's normal day-to-day operations… The 
counterpart is the horizontal test, which compares the debtor's 
business with other like businesses to determine whether the 
disputed transaction is ordinary for the particular type of business 
concerned...
The bankruptcy courts decline to approve the preferential position of the new creditor 
retroactively, when the new credit exceeds the ordinary course of business,69 unless 
the court finds that the retroactive order will further the purposes of the Bankruptcy 
Code without unfairly prejudicing parties-in-interest.70
67 See 11 USC 364(b).
68 In re Blessing Indus., 263 B.R. 268 (Bankr. D. Iowa, April 5, 2001). See also, 
Rajala v. Langer 259 B.R. 728 (D. Kan., February 27, 2001); In re Ockerlund Constr. 
Co., 308 B.R. 325 (Bankr. D. Ill., April 7, 2004); In re Atlanta Retail, 287 B.R. 849 
(Bankr. D. Ga., December 17, 2002); Moore v. Brewer, 259 B.R. 440 (Bankr. D. Ga., 
September 18, 2000); Albany Port Dist. Comm'n v. Cibro Petroleum Prods., 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17260 (D.N.Y., August 27, 2004); In re Dornier Aviation, 2002 
Bankr. LEXIS 1653 (Bankr. D. Va., December 18, 2002); Dobin v. Presidential Fin. 
Corp., 304 B.R. 681 (Bankr. D.N.J., February 18, 2004); In re Husting Land & Dev., 
Inc., 274 B.R. 906, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4092 (D. Utah, January 30, 2002).
69 Rajala v. Langer 259 B.R. 728 (D. Kan., February 27, 2001).
70 For the doctrine of the nunc pro tunc relief see In re Hillard Dev. Corp., 2004 
Bankr. LEXIS 931 (Bankr. D. Fla., April 16, 2004); In re Lehigh Valley Prof'l Sports 
Clubs, Inc., 260 B.R. 745, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 300 (Bankr. D. Pa., March 28, 2001); 
In re Ockerlund Constr. Co., 308 B.R. 325, (Bankr. D. Ill., April 7, 2004); Schwartz v. 
Aquatic Dev. Group, Inc., 352 F.3d 671, (2d Cir., December 17, 2003); Farinash v. 
Vergos, 264 B.R. 485, (D. Tenn., July 20, 2001); In re Searcy, 313 B.R. 439 (Bankr. 
D. Ark., August 23, 2004); In re Fleming Cos., 305 B.R. 389 (Bankr. D. Del., January 
29, 2004); United States v. AAPC, Inc., 277 B.R. 785 (Bankr. D. Utah, March 15, 
2002).
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The preferential position of post-petition creditors manifests the role of bankruptcy 
law: As long as the company is active, it is required to fulfill its liabilities in their 
entirety. Every new creditor who agrees to transfer new credit to the company does so 
as an aggregate to the existing debts. The new creditor knows that the company will 
be required to pay both its new debt and its other debts to preceding creditors. At a 
certain point, new potential creditors will fear the possibility that the company’s 
income will not suffice to pay the liabilities towards them and towards the creditors 
who preceded them; potential investors in the company’s shares will fear that the 
existent burden of debts will drain the company’s income, thus leaving no remaining 
source of value for the shareholders.
The commencement of bankruptcy severs the debtor’s assets from his or her pre-
petition liabilities, and thereby, enables the trustee to use the bankrupt’s assets in 
order to secure the repayment of post-petition credit. Once the business can obtain the 
necessary financial resources, it can return to lucrative activity. Indeed, the trustee's 
powers to obtain new credit and to provide the new creditor with priority over pre-
petition ones are not unlimited. The trustee may obtain the new credit only when the 
new financial resources are essential for increasing the value of the estate, i.e., when 
the attainment of new financial resources is supported by efficiency considerations.
The power of the trustee to provide the post-petition creditors with a preferential 
position highlights the conflict between pre-petition and post-petition creditors: While 
the post-petition creditor would insist on acquiring some form of seniority, pre-
petition creditors may oppose the new credit transaction because it diminishes the 
value left for the repayment of their debts. Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Act 
resolves this conflict by subordinating the trustee’s power to the adequate protection
of pre-petition holders of security interests.71 The following examples demonstrate 
how the actual legal arrangement depends on the judicial interpretation of the concept 
of adequate protection:72
a. Assume, for example, that the trustee aims at providing the new 
creditor with superior security interest, and that the prior secured 
71 11 USC 364(d)(1)(B).
72 Adequate protection is defined in 11 USC Section 361.
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creditors are over-secured: Let the value of the collateral that serves 
to secure both the pre-petition and post-petition creditors be $1M; let 
the pre-petition secured debt be $500,000 at the date of 
commencement; and let the new loan be at a value of $500,000. The 
trustee desires to provide the new creditor with a superior lien. The 
pre-petition creditor opposes the transaction, claiming that it would 
diminish the value of his security interest, in contradiction with the 
adequate protection requirement.
In the case of  Shaw Indus. v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Shaw Indus.),73
the Bankruptcy Court dealt with similar circumstances, and ruled for 
the pre-petition secured creditor. The Bankruptcy Court found that even 
though, the pre-petition creditors were over-secured, the new superior 
security interest would increase the risk that the pre-petition creditor 
would not be paid in full. In that case, the pre-petition creditor expected 
that the collateral’s value would decrease over time, and therefore, the 
junior security holders would not be fully paid.74
b. Assume for example, that the trustee desires to substitute collaterals, 
and shift the initial security interest from one collateral to another, 
in order to provide the new creditor with a superior security interest 
in the initial collateral:75 Let the value of the initial collateral be $1M, 
whereas, the initial security interest secures a debt of $500,000. The 
trustee obtains a new loan in the value of $500,000, and is willing to 
provide the new creditor with a superior security interest. For this 
purpose, the trustee substitutes collaterals, and shifts the initial security 
73 300 B.R. 861 (November, 2003).
74 For example, following the above numerical example, if the collateral's value 
decreases below $1M, then, it can no longer cover both debts. Thus, if the new 
security interest is superior to the pre-petition one, then, the initial creditor would no 
longer be repaid in full. Similarly, when the two debts continue to accumulate post-
petition interest, then, the value of the new debt is expected to increase to above 
$500,000. Thus, if the new creditor enjoys an absolute priority over the initial one, the 
remaining value that would be left after the new creditor is paid in full would not be 
sufficient to cover the initial debt.   
75 The possibility of providing adequate protection via "replacement lien" is 
fixed in subsection 361(2) of the Bankruptcy Act.
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interest to an alternate collateral of the estate, that is worth only 
$600,000. The pre-petition creditor claims that the shift of security 
interest from one collateral to another violates the adequate protection 
requirement, because it increases the risk that the value of the 
collateral would not be sufficient to cover the debt in its entirety. 
In both of these examples, there are three possible interpretations for the adequate 
protection requirement: The first possible interpretation follows the judicial decision 
in In re Shaw Indus, and prefers the interest of pre-petition creditors over the trustee’s 
interest in obtaining new credit. This interpretation would limit the powers of the 
trustee to avoid existing entitlements, even though, such limits may obstruct the 
reorganization process. Accordingly, in the first example, the court would bar the 
capability of the trustee to provide the post-petition creditor with a superior lien, even 
when the pre-petition creditors are over-secured. In the second example, the court 
would prevent the shift of security interest from one collateral to another, unless the 
value of the new collateral is equal or higher than the value of the initial collateral.76
The advantage of this interpretation is that it succeeds in protecting pre-petition 
entitlements, and thereby, encourages ex ante planning of efficient credit transactions 
before the business goes bankrupt. The trouble with this interpretation is that it 
diminishes the capability of the trustee to employ all existing sources of value for the 
purpose of obtaining new credit. In both examples, the trustee would not be able to 
use the difference between the value of the collateral and the value of the pre-petition 
debt, in order to secure the repayment of post-petition credit. Thus, the trustee may 
unnecessarily fail in his efforts to reorganize the bankrupt business. 
The second possible interpretation would limit the adequate protection requirement to 
the value of the pre-petition debt at the date of commencement. In the above 
examples, it would suffice that the trustee would maintain some security interest on 
behalf of the pre-petition creditor, in some collateral that is worth at least $500,000, 
76 Similarly, in In re Waste Conversion Techs., 205 B.R. 1004 (1997), the 
Bankruptcy Court ruled that the replacement lien must provide full compensation. 
Thus, when the initial lien is fully perfected, the creditor is entitled to automatic 
perfection in the replacement lien as well. See also In re Martin, 761 F.2d 472 (1985).
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in order to satisfy the adequate protection requirement.77 Then, in the first example, 
the trustee would be able to provide the new creditor with a superior lien on the 
collateral, because the collateral’s value would still cover the pre-petition debt of 
$500,000. In the second example, the trustee would be able to shift the initial creditor 
from the initial collateral to an alternate one, as long as the substitute collateral’s 
value exceeds $500,000. This interpretation facilitates the capability of the trustee to 
rearrange the pre-petition security interests, and thereby, maximize the remaining 
value for securing the repayment of new credit. However, this interpretation involves 
a far-reaching interference with prior entitlements, and thereby, threatens the 
capability of pre-petition creditors and solvent businesses to pre-plan their credit 
transactions.
The above theory of bankruptcy law supports a third interpretation of the adequate 
protection requirement: Under the third interpretation, adequate protection entitles the 
pre-petition secured creditor to a value equal to the value that he would have 
received, if the collateral were foreclosed immediately upon the commencement of 
bankruptcy proceedings. In the above examples, the security interest should continue 
to cover both the value of $500,000, and the market cost of delay, i.e., post-petition 
interest that is calculated according to the market interest rate. Assume, for example, 
that following reorganization, the post-petition creditor would recover his debt only 
five years after commencement. Also, assume that the market interest rate is 8%. 
Then, adequate protection requires that the collateral continue to secure the value of 
$586,660 for the pre-petition creditor. In example No. 1, the new secured credit 
cannot exceed the value of $413,340. In example No. 2, the alternate collateral must 
preserve the value of $586,660.78
77 This is the accepted judicial interpretation of adequate protection in the 
context of under-secured creditors, and creditors whose collateral only covers the 
value of the debt at the date of commencement. In the case of United Sav. Asso. v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988), the Supreme Court 
decided that adequate protection does not mandate the preservation of a cushion for 
covering the post petition interest, when the initial collateral covers the debt value at 
the date of commencement. This decision was distinguished by several later 
decisions. See, for example, LNC Invs., Inc. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 247 B.R. 
38 (2000). However, the decision was not overruled.
78 This interpretation is supported by many judicial decisions. See, for example,
In re Park West Hotel Corp., 64 B.R. 1013 (October, 1986) (The debtor's burden is to 
show not only that the market value of the property, less costs of sale and tax 
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The third interpretation accomplishes the purpose of severing the bankrupt’s assets 
from their prior inefficient entitlements, and the purpose of protecting the pre-
planning of credit transactions. In fact, following the third interpretation, the 
acquisition of new credit in reorganizations would become a quasi-monitoring 
mechanism, which enables only the companies worthy of it to go through the 
reorganization proceeding: The reorganization is appropriate only when the value of 
the company’s assets in reorganization is higher than their value in liquidation. In 
order for the reorganization plan to be efficient, it must ensure its investors a higher 
value than the alternative yield that it could have received in the market, in exchange 
for investing money that would have been received by immediately selling the 
company’s assets in liquidation. Thus, for example, if the company’s assets in 
immediate sale reach the value of 100; and the value of the market interest is 8%; 
then, reorganization will be advantageous only if the future income of the company is 
expected to exceed 8%. Otherwise, it is advisable to dissolve the company, sell its 
assets in exchange for 100, and enable its creditors to enter alternative investments 
with the money that will be received by selling the assets.  
Assume, for example, that all of the company’s existing assets are subordinated to 
pre-petition security interests. According to the third interpretation of the adequate 
protection principle, the trustee will be forced to supply the secured creditors with a 
value of 100 + an annual interest of 8%; while in relation to these values, he will not 
be able to grant any sort of preference to the new creditor. Finally, assume that the 
company requires new credit at the value of 20; the new credit will raise the current 
value of the company’s assets to 120; however, the new creditor will not be prepared 
to settle for a security which will be given to him in the new assets which were added 
to the company through the money from his loan. He will fear that this security will 
cover only the value of his debt’s capital, and not the interest as well. Therefore, he 
encumbrances, is greater than the steadily increasing amount of the secured party's 
debt; but also that it is greater by a margin sufficient to ensure that the secured party's 
interest is not at risk. In contrast, other courts have held that the mere existence of an 
equity cushion cannot be held to constitute adequate protection.); In re R & H Inv. 
Co., 46 B.R. 114 (January, 1985); In re Kertennis, 40 B.R. 895 (July, 1984); In re 
Heath, 79 B.R. 616 (November, 1987); Anchor Sav. Bank FSB v. Sky Valley, Inc., 99 
B.R. 117 (January, 1989); In re Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396 (June, 1984). 
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will agree to transfer the new credit only if the company’s income will have an annual 
yield, which exceeds 8; in this way, the trustee will be able to meet the adequate 
protection conditions towards the previous creditors, as well as ensure the new 
creditor’s sources of payment. In other words, the new creditor will not be prepared to 
invest in the company, unless he expects the company’s business to produce higher 
values than the market’s yield on the credit. 
The monitoring mechanism on the company’s ability to raise new credit during 
reorganization is extremely important: At the stage of examining the reorganization 
plan, there is no certainty as to the advantageousness of the reorganization. The 
court’s decision is a result of valuation formulae, which rely on the future 
hypothetical values of the reorganized company. Valuation techniques enable much 
flexibility and may lead to substantial imparities in the possible results. This difficulty 
is magnified in light of the frequency of the possibility that different interested parties 
in the company will try to distort the results of the assessment, in order to drive the 
court to decide on the liquidation or the reorganization in accordance with their 
personal interests, which do not always conform with the general aims presented 
above. 
Thus, when reorganization is the action taken, it is expected that in nearly every 
company in distress, a group of claimants (i.e., controlling shareholders, managers of 
the company or regular creditors) will appear asking for a piece of the reorganization 
yield. This group will suggest reorganization plans, which are based on an optimistic 
assessment of the expected revenue of the company, only because they may 
personally profit more from this than from liquidation.  When the reorganization 
proceeding is possible, although the value of the company in reorganization is not 
higher or lower than the value that would have been paid in immediate sale, it harms 
the company’s creditors in their entirety, instead of being beneficial to them. The 
reorganization also involves considerable costs, which are necessary in order to 
activate the company in the framework of the collective proceedings, postponing the 
payment of the debts and leading new creditors to invest in the failing company. 
Therefore, it is important that also the trustee will not be able to raise new credit for 
the reorganization without any limits. The adequate protection for the previous 
secured creditors will ensure that the raising of credit will be done only when there 
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are investors who believe that the company’s revenue will outweigh the value of the 
market interest.
3. Executory Contracts
The role of bankruptcy law is most clearly manifested by the legal arrangement of 
executory contracts:79 As long as the company is active, it cannot be released from 
commitments it took upon itself, also when these turn out to be non-profitable 
investments. After the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, the trustee is 
entitled the choice between performance and avoidance of pre-petition contractual 
obligations. If the trustee would select to perform the contract, then, both parties (the 
bankrupt estate and the other contractual party) would have to abide by the pre-
petition liabilities; otherwise, the estate would not perform its duties under the 
contract, and the other parties would be forced to share the value of the estate with the 
other non-secured creditors. 
In order to clarify the practical meaning of this arrangement, it is important to note 
the different stages that the company’s contracts can be found in at the beginning of 
the collective proceedings: 
a. Either early stages of performance, or, continuous contracts: It is possible 
that the company entered into the contract, however both parties have not yet 
implemented the majority if the contractual obligations involved in it. A similar 
possibility arises when both parties have already partially performed the contract, 
however it is a continuous one, where both parties are committed to implementing 
different commitments over a period of time. Thus, at any point of time that the 
collective collection proceedings will begin, there will still remain many obligations 
that the parties will have not yet performed. 
79 See 11 U.S.C.S. 365. Section 365 grants the authority to the liquidator or the trustee 
to choose whether to assume, assign or to reject an executory contract. Executory 
contracts are contracts in which both parties, i.e., the company and the second party to 
the contract, have not yet performed all of their commitments. Every contract which 
has a mutual commitment can be considered an executory contract. Thus, for 
example, shareholder agreements, which commit one of the shareholders who reaches 
liquidation, will be considered executory contracts from the point of view of the 
shareholders. See In re Riodizio, Inc., 204 B.R. 417, 424 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In 
re Parkwood Realty Corp., 157 B.R. 687, 689 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1993);Vecchitto v. 
Vecchitto, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 25439.
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b. Intermediate stages of performance: It is possible that the creditor has already 
implemented his obligations towards the company, however the company has not yet 
implemented its obligations towards him. 
c. Intermediate stages of performance: It is also possible that the company 
implemented its obligations towards a third party, however he has not yet 
implemented his contractual obligations.
d. Advanced stages of performance: Finally, it is possible that both parties 
fulfilled the majority of their mutual contractual commitments. 
The arrangement of executory contracts refers only to contracts of the first type: In 
the second stage of performance, the trustee will avoid fulfilling the company’s 
obligation towards the creditor, when the latter can claim his debt in collective 
proceedings.80 At the third stage of performance, the trustee will be able to file for 
performance on behalf of the estate. At the fourth stage of performance, both parties 
will have performed their obligations, therefore the collective proceeding does not 
affect the parties’ rights. The Bankruptcy Court defined the relevant contracts to this 
arrangement as follows:81 “…a contract under which the obligation of both the 
bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of 
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the 
performance of the other.” 
Then, the law grants the trustee or liquidator the right to reexamine the profitability of 
the transaction, from the point of view of the company. Only in the event that the 
foreseen return that is to be received as a result of performing the contract is higher 
than the value that the company has not yet paid according to the contract, the trustee 
must implement it. Otherwise, the contract should be perceived as an “unprofitable 
contract” that should be “avoided.” For example, if we are discussing a contract to 
purchase an apartment from a real-estate company, and the company reached 
80 There is an internal conflict on this issue, as to how to classify option 
contracts. The leading approach is that options will not be considered executory 
contracts, unless the owner of the option decides to realize the option before 
submitting the request for bankruptcy. See, for example, In re Robert L. Helms 
Construction and Development Co., 139 F.3d 702 (1998).
81 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Klinger (In re Knutson), 563 F.2d 916, 917 (8th 
Cir., 1977); In re James M. Craig, 144 F.3d 593 (1998).
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insolvency during the building process, the trustee will have to estimate the expected 
return which is expected to be received from the buyer and compare it both to the 
costs of finishing the building, and to the cost of losing the alternative contract (in 
which the apartment will be sold to a different buyer). The trustee will choose to 
perform the contract only when the value of the return balance that he will receive 
from the buyer is higher than these costs. 
The following numerical example clarifies this situation (see Table No. 1 below):
Table No. 1: Examining the Existence of a Burdensome Asset
Numerical example Denoted:




Balance due 150 EPc
Current market price of 
the apartment
400 Vm
Value of implementing 
the contract
(150 – 100) (EPc - Cb)





(400 – 100 – 50) (Vm - Cb – TC)
The trustee’s necessary 
decision
Since the value of 
implementing the contract 
is lower than the value of 
the alternative transaction, 
the trustee must refrain 
from executing the 
contract.
Max{(EPc - Cb), (Vm - Cb –
TC)}
The trustee must choose the 
most profitable alternative 
for the estate; therefore, he 
must prefer an alternative 
transaction if it is expected 
to yield a higher value, and 
vice versa.
In the numerical example, if the trustee would choose to execute the contract, he 
would receive from the buyer the return balance, and transfer the apartment to him, 
after finishing the building. The liquidation fund will bear the costs of completing the 
building. In contrast, if the trustee would avoid the contract, he would be able to sell 
the apartment to a new potential buyer. Indeed then, the trustee would have to bear 
the costs of completing the building and finding a new buyer as well as performing 
the contract with him, however in many cases, the yield that this alternative will 
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provide will be higher than the yield the trustee would receive from performing the 
contract.
The example clarifies also that when examining the performance of executory 
contracts, the trustee will not be able to be satisfied with positioning the value of the 
balance due against the costs of completing the construction; rather, he must also take 
into account the price that he will be able to receive from selling the apartment to a 
third party. Only when performing the contract will lead to a higher profit than the 
alternative transaction, he should prefer to perform the contract. Thus, for example, in 
a situation where prices of apartments are gradually dropping, the trustee may find 
that performing the original contracts will be more beneficial. In contrast, in a 
situation where prices of apartments are rising, the more efficient alternative will 
usually be to cancel the existing contracts in favor of new transactions at higher 
prices. Of course, the buyer can try to entice the trustee into choosing the alternative 
of performing the contract, by showing willingness to enlarge the balance due. The 
buyer’s willingness to relinquish part of his contractual rights, and transfer larger 
amounts of money to the estate, will enable the completion of the construction of the 
apartment on his behalf. Finally, the trustee must consider the fact that the alternative 
transaction will bind him to the costs which are entailed in the transaction. Therefore, 
the trustee or the liquidator’s willingness to continue performing the original 
contracts will be dependent also on the fluidity of the company’s assets. 
This legal arrangement implies that the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings 
entitles the trustee to the right to avoid onerous and non-profitable contracts. The law 
enables the trustee to free the estate from non-profitable liabilities in ways that are not 
available outside the bankruptcy proceedings. The purpose of this legal arrangement 
is to facilitate the severance of economic resources from inefficient entitlements, in 
order to enable their return to lucrative business activity. 
